Four models of European citizenship

This paper identifies two ideal types of citizenship - the cosmopolitan and the communitarian, that correspond to the transnational and sub/national levels of the European Union respectively, and examines four different ways in which they might be combined

Which constitution for what kind of Europe?

Discussion of the pros and cons of an EU constitution tends to focus upon two issues. On the one hand, proponents and opponents of reform seek to legitimate the EU as a 'regime', or form of governance. For example, strengthening the powers of the European Parliament is hoped to improve democratic accountability, while incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is suggested as a way of enhancing legal integrity and the rule of law. On the other hand, debate centres on the EU's status as a 'polity', and the degree to which a Constitution might allow a clear demarcation of what is the EU's area of competence and what remains the domain of domestic governments and legal systems. These two issues are inter-related. Yet, neither politicians nor many academics explicitly address the connections between them. Some focus on 'regime' considerations and seek, almost as an after thought, to tailor them to their preferred view of the EU polity. Others, especially Eurosceptics, treat the very discussion of the EU as having a regime, as an undesirable move in the direction of acknowledging it as a polity. In this piece I wish to suggest that both approaches are misguided. Regime and polity interact, with the latter constraining (without determining) the former. I shall explore the three dominant models of constitutionalism to be found within European political discourse: a rights-based model, a popular sovereignty model and a common law model that employs elements of each. Whilst the first two are the most frequently employed by proponents of constitutional reform, I shall suggest that it is the third that best represents the actually existing EU constitution. Moreover, it has been the key to the successful integration of Europe hitherto precisely because it has allowed both the 'regime', and 'polity', dimensions of the EU to develop in tandem

The democratic legitimacy of international human rights conventions: Political constitutionalism and the European convention on human rights

International Human Rights Courts (IHRCts), such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have come under increasing criticism as being incompatible with domestic judicial and legislative mechanisms for upholding rights. These domestic instruments are said to possess greater democratic legitimacy than international instruments do or could do. Within the UK this critique has led some prominent judges and politicians to propose withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Legal cosmopolitans respond by denying the validity of this democratic critique. By contrast this article argues that such criticisms are defensible from a political constitutionalist perspective but that International Human Rights Conventions (IHRCs) can nevertheless be understood in ways that meet them. To do so, IHRC must be conceived as legislated for and controlled by an international association of democratic states, which authorizes IHRCts and holds them accountable, limiting them to 'weak review'. The resulting model of IHRC is that of a 'two level' political constitution. The ECHR is shown to largely accord with this model, which is argued to be both more plausible and desirable than a legal cosmopolitan model that sidelines democracy and advocates 'strong' review

The liberty of the post-moderns? Market and civic freedom within the EU

Taking its cue from Benjamin's Constant's famous essay, this article uses the case of EU citizenship to explore how far ancient, civic, freedom can be combined with modern, market, freedom. Many commentators have, in different ways, argued that the forces promoting European integration call for a new form of post-national citizenship that either builds civic freedom on the basis of the liberties of the moderns or does away with the need for it altogether. These arguments are disputed. Constant perceptively raised a number of problems with this analysis, while ignoring - or being ignorant of - a number of others. As he noted, ancient liberty corrects various pathologies and lacunas of modern liberty, but he overlooked the degree to which its survival rested on the continuing importance of certain pre-modern forms of social solidarity in modern times. Those seeking new forms of post-modern citizenship tend to ignore one or other or both these points. The piece concludes by arguing that the only practical way of combining ancient and modern liberty within the EU is to view it as a particularly intense form of international cooperation between democratic states rather than as a supranational organisation that transcends its component parts

Richard Bellamy

The author replies to five questions about his approach to political philosophy and his views about its prospects for the future

Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level games

The crisis of the euro area has severely tested the political authority of the European Union (EU). The crisis raises questions of normative legitimacy both because the EU is a normative order and because the construction of economic and monetary union (EMU) rested upon a theory that stressed the normative value of the depoliticization of money. However, this theory neglected the normative logic of the two-level game implicit in EMU. It also neglected the need for an impartial and publically acceptable constitutional order to acknowledge reasonable disagreements. By contrast, we contend that any reconstruction of the EU's economic constitution has to pay attention to reconciling a European monetary order with the legitimacy of member state governance. The EU requires a two-level contract to meet this standard. Member states must treat each other as equals and be representative of and accountable to their citizens on an equitable basis. These criteria entail that the EU's political legitimacy requires a form of demoicracy that we call ‘republican intergovernmentalism’. Only rules that could be acceptable as the product of a political constitution among the peoples of Europe can ultimately meet the required standards of political legitimacy. Such a political constitution could be brought about through empowering national parliaments in EU decision-making

The good, the bad and the ugly: the need for constitutional compromise and the drafting of the EU constitution

The Convention on the Future of Europe has provoked both cynicism and idealism. Cynics see it as a largely rhetorical exercise that consolidates but does not go beyond the achievements of recent intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) or greatly transform the nature of the EU. Idealists view it as offering the potential for a new departure that replaces intergovernmental bargaining with genuine deliberation to produce a genuine European consensus. According to this interpretation, a constitution should take the form of a contract that all rational individuals possessing a sense of justice would approve. This paper disputes both these views. Reasonable disagreement means that a constitutional consensus is never possible and some form of compromise necessary. Such compromises need not be simply the product of a self-interested bargain, though. There are good compromises as well as bad and ugly or poorly drafted and misguided ones. This paper provides criteria for distinguishing these three types and explores examples of each of them in the Convention on the Future of Europe and the resulting draft constitution

The normative turn in European Union studies: legitimacy, identity and democracy

By raising fundamental questions about the methods and ultimate goals of European integration, Maastricht forced supporters and opponents alike to confront the legitimacy both of the Union and - as has become apparent with the crisis of the Santer Commission - of the institutional architecture put in place to steer it. The strategic-oriented action and normative argument avoided for so long by the main political actors, are inescapable when tackling this issue. Thus, national politicians and European authorities have self-consciously, though perhaps confusedly, been obliged to start discussing the future shape of what Jacques Delors once called ‘un object politique non-identifié.’ Academics, for their part, have discovered that the integration process depends not simply on functional efficiency and certain given economic and national interests, but also on people’s ideals and perceptions. Consequently, explanation and justification have proved less easily distinguishable than earlier positivistic and behaviouralist models assumed. Hence, the ‘normative turn’ in European studies. In this essay we wish to clarify certain aspects of the normative turn (section 1) and to explore some of the substantive issues that emerge from subjecting the European integration process to normative scrutiny (sections 2, 3 and 4). In the conclusion, we shall sketch the kind of normative politics we feel best suits the emerging European polity

Globalization and Representative Democracy: Normative Challenges

Globalization has typically been regarded as challenging representative democracy at the state level. This chapter outlines four of these challenges—that of democratic externalities, of transnational global processes and supranational organizations, of cosmopolitan norms, and of effective and justified representation at the global level. It then explores three solutions that have been put forward to meet them: scaling up to a supra-national regional or even a global democracy for certain issues; creating a trans-national network of democratic bodies that address different issues and functions; or having inter-national associations of representative states under the equal control of their elected representatives. Whilst the first and second solutions are shown to create problems of both representation surpluses and deficits—some groups get over-represented and other groups under-represented, it is argued that the third solution can avoid both these difficulties and that it addresses the challenges more directly